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PARK FOREST SOUTH was to be an inno-
vative new community of 110,000 people by
1990. So said the developers, the U.S. Hous-
ing and Urban Development agency and the
spokesmen of what seemed to be a burgeon-
ing new town movement in the 1960s.
Today, two-thirds of the developers have
expediently withdrawn, HUD is talking fore-
closure, and the movement, what is left of it,
is lying low till the cross-fire dies down.
Below: The development company's office
building, by Harry Weese & Associates.





•As any 8-ye«r-old can tell you, it's just no
good grabbing one squiggle of a Slinky and
running hell-bent up the stairs. The rest will
come along anyway and, sure as shooting, by
the time you get to the top, will be in an
awful tangle.
But what every 8-year-old kid knows, the
U.S. federal government and America's
"enlightened" real estate developers are
learning the hard way—at least when it comes
to taking a tug at new towns.
Illinois' own Park Forest South—once the
way-out-in-front one of the government-
backed American new towns—is in just as
much of a tangle as any of them, if not more
so.
But in 1968, it was all a shiny new toy.
New Towns—capital N, capital T—were
mid-20th century style Erewhon, post-war
Saint-Simon. Depending on whose ideology
one accepted, new towns were a way to sop
up excess urban population, a more rational
method of building than suburban sprawl, or
the Utopian perfect-people-from-perfect-
environments future.
With due respect to Sweden, Finland and
France, it was the British experience that
made new towns New Towns. Faced with a
severe housing shortage after the war,
England launched an urban offensive with a
breadth and intensity that we reserve for
poking into space. In short time, there were
dozens of new self-reliant communities and
a record of almost unmitigated success.
By the 1960s, Europe Jr. had begun a few
new towns of its own—most notably
Columbia, Md., and Reston, Va.—with private
money. The early returns on these looked
good; it was an idealistic decade to begin
with; and suddenly Congress was passing the
National Communities Act in 1968, a vague
bill offering federally backed loan guarantees
to developers of new towns.
In 1970, the offer was extended to include
loans for interest payments and grants for
anything from planning to mass transit to
educational programming. Park Forest South
signed up.
Park Forest South, at that point, was a
bankrupt subdivision called Woodhill,
35 miles south of Chicago, with a population
of about 1000, that had been bought up by
the late developer Nathan Manilow in the
hopes of annexing it to next-door neighbor
Park Forest.
Park Forest was a suburb he and Phillip M.
Klutznick had developed decades before,
though a suburb remembered less for its
large scale of development and multifamily
housing than for its transient junior execu-
tives that inspired William H. Whyte's The
Organization Man. In any case, Manilow had
long lost control of his brainchild and annex-
ation was voted down.
But what he did once, he could do again,
he thought. This time he teamed with sub-
sidiaries of the Illinois Central railroad and
U.S. Gypsum. The 1C had a train station not
far away in Richton Park and promised to
extend the line to the new development and,
further, planned to move its 1C hospital lock,
stock and barrel there as well. And U.S.
Gypsum was in the home products business
anyway and thought, like many big com-
panies of the late '60s, that real estate was a
good investment.
The federal offer looked good, too, and
when the more cornucopic 1970 version was
passed, Park Forest South was an eager and
successful applicant.
HUD gave the developers a federal guarantee
with which to float $30 million in bonds-
money needed to buy land and put in sewers
and roads—and every reason to expect a
battery of fringes and help when they needed
it. In return, the developers put up $5 million
in equity, agreed to include poor people and
minorities, to provide jobs as well as bed-
rooms, to orchestrate services and amenities,
and to be innovative.
The town was to have more than 110,000
people on more than 8000 acres, by 1990.
It was to have a linear town center with all
the usual accouterments, plus a bazaar, open
market and sculpture garden.
There was to be 25 per cent open space in
the community, mass transit, 70 per cent
multifamily housing, 12 to 15 per cent
subsidized housing, a prefabricated hockey
rink and tennis courts, cable TV, an 1C
station, a hospital, a university and an indus-
trial park.
By the end of 1974, Park Forest South
had a 750-acre Governor's State University
(for which Manilow traded 200 free acres and
free sewer and water), an ahead-of-schedule
industrial park offering two jobs for every
household in the community, and 5000
residents. It was the most advanced of all
the 13 HUD-sponsored new towns.
By the end of 1974, Park Forest South also
had defaulted on more than $1 million of
interest payments, its home construction
had dropped in half, and a lot of the sched-
uled amenities weren't there yet. This was
about par with the other HUD-sponsored
new towns.
Today, Park Forest South is a town in
limbo. The $30 million that was supposed to
last 20 years was gone at four. Housing units
that were supposed to sell—according to early
reports—at a rate of 2500 per year are selling
at a rate of about 200 instead.
The cable TV system is only partly
installed. The company that was doing so is
now bankrupt and unsuable. The town is not
so eager to have CATV anyway.
There is no hospital. The 1C couldn't get it
together without government help, which it
never received. Another possibility, Lutheran
General South, fell through. Presbyterian-
St. Luke's also agreed to build there, but ran
into trouble getting a permit from the county
medical association, which cost them a year's
delay, which lost them a chance at federal
funds, which helped run them into a cost
overrun of $10 million, which cancelled their
plans to build. >
Only six years old, the new town's future is
up in the air. Below: a view of much of what
is there now—the developers' office building,
multiplexes and single family homes, five
apartment buildings of which one is
subsidized housing.
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Only 59 moderate-income units were built,
what with President Nixon's moratorium on
such things. However, a 170-unit high-rise
for the elderly has just opened, financed by
the Illinois Housing Development Authority.
Mass transit never has materialized as any-
thing more than a bus between the college,
Richton Park 1C station and downtown
Park Forest South, and even that may go in
the present downswing, in anticipation of
which event the village is negotiating with
RTA for funding. The 1C station—designed
by the Office of Mies van der Rohe—finally
has got Department of Transportation money,
and plans call for completion in fall, 1976.
There are a professional quality golf course
and a fiberglas ice rink and a community
recreational center and a few neighborhood
centers.
But Ravinia South, a pet project of Lewis
Manilow—son of Nathan, lawyer, art collector,
theater backer and, since his father's death
in 1971, operating partner of PFS—Ravinia
South was aborted.
Despite low costs and an eager impresario,
the outdoor amphitheater idea was killed by
students and faculty from the university who
protested the use of degraded prairie for its
site. "The issue wouldn't even be raised now,"
says Manilow. "But then they needed one...
Degraded prairie—there's a real prairie 20
minutes away!"
The town center, planned as a three-mile-
long strip instead of a cluster, consists of a
bank, a village hall, the developer's office
building (designed by Harry Weese &
Associates and possibly the only
"architecture" in the place) and a "possible
developer and major tenant for a shopping
center."
The elementary school is overcrowded,
but a new junior high, just opened, and a
senior high, about to be built, will relieve
the double shifts at the high school in the
neighboring suburb where PFS kids have
to be channelled now.
Park Forest South isn't a ghost town by
any means yet, but there is a certain pall in
the air. In response to the general slowing
down, one builder—Kennedy Brothers Inc.—
filed suit, claiming damages because the value
of the land it bought was less than it would
have been if the hospital and commercial
development had kept pace.
The developer's own top staff have formed
a company of their own called CNH Asset
Management—headed by the developer's top
man, George Cadar—just in case. Just in
case, that is, everything goes under.
Park Forest South Developers Co. now owns
most of the land. New Community Enter-
prises (the same people but under a different
corporate structure) owns the office building,
ice lodge, golf course, commercial strip and
some housing). If these companies fold, the
staff, as CNH Asset Management, is there
waiting to offer its management talents to
the next boss—be it HUD, a new developer,
a bank, whomever.
Meanwhile, every six months more than
$1 million becomes due in interest and fees
on the $30 million loan, with little incoming
income to pay it.
Last winter, the development partners and
HUD worked out a deal to generate some
ready cash and give Lewis Manilow's faint-
hearted fellow investors a graceful exit. 1C
and Gypsum coughed up $2 million each,
Manilow $11/2 million, to buy land from the
PFS Development Co. The deal prevents
any of the three from reselling or developing
that land for several years—more like pawn-
ing than selling. The deal also washes out
IC's and Gypsum's connection with the
whole affair.
The $5.5 million thus generated paid the
September 1974 and February 1975 interest,
and operating expenses. By September 1975,
however, it had all but run out, and once
again PFS Development Co. defaulted on the
$1 million interest payment—which was then
picked up by HUD.
So the question is, what happens now?
When the $5.5 million deal was put together,
it was intended as a temporary stay of execu-
tion while HUD and Manilow worked out
some refinancing. Manilow was quoted as
saying: "I'm going to devote the next six
months of my life to seeing that this thing
gets on the right footing."
Well, six months have come and gone.
Manilow decided that refinancing—more
loan guarantees—was a poor solution.
"Twenty million on top won't work as a
strict financial deal. Piling up more debt
under foreseeable market conditions is no
solution," he says.
What Manilow wants is a version of the
deal HUD is making with the once equally
euphoric Jonathan, Minn.—another new town
in similar straits. Jonathan's old ownership
fell apart a few years ago. HUD and the
potential new owner are hammering out a
contract which involves $1Vi million new
equity from the owner (who is interested in
a tax shelter and is awaiting an IRS ruling
on its permissibility), deferred interest and
half fees for five years, and an immediate
infusion of $4 million in straight grants.
The citizens of Park Forest South have a
few ideas of their own. Unlike the other new
towns, PFS has had a village government
from the beginning—a fact that has been
boasted,of, but not always appreciated by,
the developer.
Until recently, the biggest disigreement
has involved Thorn Creek Woods, a huge
natural preserve that was threatened by both
a superhighway and development. First the
citizens killed the road, then lobbied state
and county into buying large sections of the
forest for parkland. In the end, the developer
too threw in a contribution.
But the current disagreement goes even
deeper. The village wants to take over the
development.
"We've been negotiating with HUD all
along," says village manager Charles Notarus.
•
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"Our attitude is that we are a viable com-
munity with an industrial base, recreation,
services. We want to grow as a planned com-
munity.
"We might put together a public building
authority. We're investigating now whether
provisos in the Illinois statutes would encom-
pass this. If so, we'd issue bonds, and we think
they'd sell.
"Or the village could expand its recreation
board's scope with additional authority and
assume control of open spaces, flood plains,
etc. That plus traditional zoning and sub-
division laws could influence growth. But it
would limit the dollars available for amenities,
that way."
Why not go with Manilow? "The present
developer may have a problem with credibil-
ity," Notarus confides. "A lot of things have
been promised."
The mystery player in this affair is HUD
itself. It has several options. For one thing,
it can foreclose. PFS Development Co. is in
default and HUD can, at any time,
demand the deed to the unsold land—the bulk
of the new town.
Having done so, HUD would be faced with
the same problems Manilow faces—but with
a bigger cash reserve than Manilow has—or it
could decide to sell the land. It might try to
sell in bulk to a new developer-either the
village or some company in need of tax
write-offs—or it could sell bit-by-bit and
simply abandon the idea of a planned town
as a dumbo idea in the first place.
If foreclosure is the path chosen, the deve-
lopers would be out the original $5 million.
HUD would stand to lose either the net cost
of development if it decided to keep the
land—this could eventually be profitable, of
course—or the net loss on the property, if
the decision was to sell. New Community
Enterprises, a private company owned at
this point by Lewis Manilow, would not
revert to HUD. Its loans are held by Chicago's^
Points of interest in the new town: Thorn
Creek Woods (top); the high-rise for the
elderly and ice skating rink (middle); and
Hickock Lodge, an all-village recreational
center.
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Continental Bank. So if the ice lodge and
apartments don't pay, the bank is entitled
to these properties.
If HUD doesn't foreclose, it must either go
on picking up the interest tab for Manilow
until business picks up, or work out a deal
that will make PFS a going concern.
Timothy Vanderver, special counsel to the
New Communities Administration section of
HUD, told me: "We are less advanced with
the Park Forest South negotiations than with
any of the other new towns. The problems
surfaced later, and are more complicated.
I cannot see, however, how they can think
that we would give interest deferments or
grants. The statute says that to qualify for
deferment a community must be economically
viable. Park Forest South is not economically
viable, according to their own report.
"It is less viable than Riverton, N.Y., when
that town fired all its staff and shut down. It
is the least viable of all the new towns. As
for grants, it would take a massive infusion,
and all we have is $13.1 million to spread
through all 13 towns."
To that news, Manilow responds: "There
is a hysteria and a snottiness at HUD. But
they've told me for years that we were their
best project and we're no less viable than the
others, that's for sure. I'm negotiating with
possible new partners—it would mean fresh
cash—and the attitude I get from HUD's new
program director, Melvin Margolies, is 'show
us a live one and we'll talk.' "
What Vanderver may be referring to when
he says PFS' own report admits it is unviable
is a marketing study by Shlaes & Co. com-
missioned by Lewis Manilow. The Shlaes
study, done under the supervision of Michael
Young, scales down sales expectations to
300 to 400 housing units each year. And it
counsels that while the industrial park should
be a whopping success, it would be advisable
to forget office rentals—no market—and a
regional shopping center (there are two
already within four miles).
The study also suggests that PFS suffers
from a lack of identity. Not only the name,
which sounds like the annexation that never
happened, but that it lacks an appearance,
or a magnet. The report adds that the town
center is too spread out, that the new town is
too far away from Chicago, and that for
the blue-collar market to which it appeals,
multifamily housing is unpopular.
All of which gets us into the juiciest part
of the plot—what happened? Why bonfire
to embers in only four short years? Was
somebody dumb? Was everybody crooked?
Or was it kismet?
The most obvious answer is that the
economy fell apart. The new towns, Park
Forest South among them, got caught in a
squeeze. On the one hand, inflation was
driving costs far beyond estimates. On the
other, a collapsed housing market, resulting
from high interest rates, was cutting off
income. The slower pace led to mushrooming
carrying costs and insufficient support for
necessary services like schools and commuter
stations.
"A recession is inevitable," comments
Manilow, "in a 20-year development period.
The problem is we got it at birth. A 3-year-
old can die of the measles, a 10-year-old will
survive."
HUD deserves some blame too, Manilow
feels. "HUD got pushed back from a major
agency in the forefront to a background one.
As a result, it could never get its policy
together. We got a new New Town director
every year or so. Thirteen developers have
no political muscle. The whole relationship
has been incredibly time-consuming. All that
bureaucracy. We got no sense of what they
wanted to accomplish besides filling their
files."
Says Lawrence Lawless of 1C Industries:
"Dealing with the government was like
punching a pillow. First you have to find the
pillow and when you punch it, it just goes,
'Ahh...we'll study it.' "
Says Steve Lincoln, former director of
architecture and planning for Park Forest
South: "The agreement between HUD and
PFS had no rights and obligations of parties
set legally. You can't plan a 20-year project
on the basis of a two-year political term.
Fifty per cent of our time was taken up in
paperwork for HUD. You can't work real
estate in those time-frames."
Developers in other towns have echoed the
same sentiments. While HUD spokesman
Vanderver pooh-poohs these criticisms as
having some legitimacy but overstated, some
facts remain.
The statute provided for loans to cover
interest payments; until Jonathan, Minn.,
HUD never granted any. The statute provided
money for assistance on many items; only a
fraction was spent. Of a $168 million kitty
of grant money approved by Congress, only
$25 million was approved for expenditure,
only $11.5 million actually spent. Nixon's
impoundments cut off money for subsidized
housing while the government was pumping
tens of billions into war, weaponry and
space.
There seems to have been a definite change
in attitude between the time when George
Romney, Secretary of HUD, could say in
1972: "You are going to see greater move-
ment in this new community area by this
administration [Nixon] because it is com-
mitted to the new community approach"
and two years later—when under the steward-
ship of Secretary James Lynn, new towns
were suddenly regarded as a hangover
Johnson program.
As for red tape, the $5.5 million deal,
says Manilow, took six months and 50,000
pages of documents. Indeed, it is still going
on. HUD changed its guidelines on how to
appraise the property, and now the developei
may even go to court to find out how many
acres they got for their money. >
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Governor's State University spent two years
in a factory in the industrial park while the
new complex, designed by Caudill Rowlett
& Scott, was being built (right). Although
the entire school is housed in one continuous
building (below), the University owns 750
acres of the community.
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A commercial strip (right), but not yet a
shopping center, has been built as well as
several subdivisions of housing (opposite).
Said the Washington Post: The developers
originally hoped to save 1.5 to 2 per cent on
costs with HUD grants and low-interest loans,
but with the reduction in grants and bureau-
cratic delays, it was reduced to .2 per cent,
which they don't feel is enough to make up
for the social freight HUD makes them carry.
But while developers are accusing HUD of
daytripping, the watchdogs of the General
Accounting Office are accusing developers of
a few things, too. GAO says the developers—
and this means all or most of the 13—are
guilty of appraising their land too high,
putting in too little equity and being over-
optimistic about their market. This last con-
clusion is one with which the Shlaes study
agrees. Michael Young of the Shlaes team
visited a number of the new towns in addition
to PFS and found an "almost total inadequacy
of market research...all the studies were
unsupportably inflated."
GAO goes on to say that the new towns
show a lot of redundant spending. Each side
thinks the other behaved haphazardly
because that other side didn't have to bear
the responsibility for mistakes. 1C Industries'
Lawrence Lawless accuses the government
of getting all the fun of regulating while
accepting none of the financial onus. GAO
accuses the developers of managing the
towns sloppily because Uncle Sam was a
bottomless honeypot.
They're both right, in a sense. No one
had any clear responsibility. The federal
government never really decided to establish
an alternative urban pattern called New
Towns or even a few urban laboratory experi-
ments. It merely undertook to guarantee a
few large-scale real estate loans.
It was a piecemeal project and it wound
up in pieces. "The new towns range from
bad to awful," says Vanderver. He means
financially, and of course he's right
But the feds didn't go in there to make
money. They could do better with inside
tips on the stock market. There is no point
to federal involvement with new towns unless
they are producing something new, good,
and something that would not normally
happen by itself in the marketplace.
But the government never really decided
what it was after. The statute called for
these towns to be economically sound, con-
tribute to the social welfare of the area,
increase the available choices for living and
working, conserve land, advance technology,
etc. As one urban critic complained, "It is
like the sky, covering everything but touching
nothing."
How do new towns fit into our national
policy on urban growth? (What national
policy on urban growth?) Are new towns to
siphon off the inner city or show subdivision
developers a better way to do things?
Nowhere is it recognized in the statute or
subsequent regulations quite how serious is
the conflict between the goals of social
welfare and economic soundness. If the
emphasis is on social welfare, for instance,
that means—among other things—integration
racially and economically, some of which
has been known to have a depressing effect
on the market. Park Forest South, which has
managed only the racial integration to any
real degree—it is 20 per cent black—has cer-
tainly found this to be true.
On the other hand, if the emphasis is on
economic soundness, the developer will save
subsidized housing for last in order to avoid
market problems, and by that time, like as
not, the good citizens of Newville will dis-
cover managed growth or some other exclu-
sionary tactic to block it.
If the emphasis is on social welfare, the
new town will be located where jobs and
homes are needed but missing. If the empha-
sis is on economic soundness, the town will
go where there is greatest growth potential,
an area that probably would be developed
even without government help.
HUD spokesman Vanderver admits: "No
doubt there is an inherent conflict in the
statute between social goals and financial
aspects. The developers and HUD have gone
back and forth. Now the emphasis is on
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financial. It's hard to achieve social goals in
foreclosure."
Actually, it is no harder than at any other
time, if the government wants to accomplish
them. What is the total outlay that HUD
stands to lose—that is, if it forecloses on all
13 towns, and if it then gives away the land
at no return? Some $275 million. It sounds
like a lot, until you put in next to, say, one
day's losses in the Vietnam war.
But this assumes that the US had taken up
an idea—a complex, intraconnected idea—
and run with it. Which it hadn't.
If it had, there would have been money to
insure mass transit, subsidized housing,
hospitals, etc. But grant money from HUD,
much less a separate agency like the Depart-
ment of Transportation, drifted in and out
with little coordination.
If it had, there would have been an aware-
ness of the third party in this arrangement-
the village itself-and its needs not only for
things like police protection, but for some
relationship with HUD.
If it had, there would have been planning
based on optimization of set values and
priorities-values that would have included
not only integration and environmental pro-
tection but ideas about the mix of privacy
and gregariousness, security and activity.
Instead, a town like Park Forest South was
located where the developer happened to
own land. Greenways were placed where
there happened to be pipelines that would
have interfered with housing foundations. The
town center was dragged out three miles
because there happened to be a subdivision
at one end and a proposed commuter station
at the other.
But if the government had really embarked
on a major national policy, if it had really
faced the decisions and set the priorities,
then it would also have had to insure their
realization.
In Britain, the national government bought
the land, put in infrastructure, and then sold
it to builders who build according to govern-
ment regulations. There was no shortage of
front end money; no interference from local
codes or licensing bodies; more, there was
minimal competition. British law gives the
government far more control over how land
is developed than ours. Park Forest South
was hurt by a market that chose the south-
west suburb of Bolingbrook instead of it.
In England, Bolingbrook could have been
prevented from building.
In America, there is much hue and cry
over private enterprise and the political
impossibility of such a system. ("We can't
even get a federal land-use bill passed,"
says Manilow).
Railroads and Lockheed aside, the situation
remains: either the U.S. must copy Britain's
techniques or find some other way to solve
the same problems. Ignoring them leads to a
huge tangle, only part way up the stairs.
Beyond the financial tangle is the idealistic
one. American new towns aren't really all
that different from subdivision suburbs.
There's a little more recreation; a few people
live closer to work-although all the suburbs
want industry these days to shore up their
tax bases; and a few more poor people are
out of the ghetto (the middle class minorities
are going to make it to the suburbs by them-
selves, they can pay for it).
Nor is America suffering from a terrible
housing shortage—at least for the middle
classes—as England was after the war.
There is a thoughtful line of argument that
says, if our public resources are limited, they
should be put into the inner city where they
might do the most good. Certainly a govern-
ment program that is interested merely in
recouping investment on a job fractionally
done has little to offer in social gain.
It would be nice if HUD sat down on the
stair, untangled that poor Slinky, and made
it do its wonderful tricks again. But it looks
as though HUD is just looking for a kid
brother or neighbor on which to foist the
mangled remains. In any case, it is too willing
to cut off the tangles and accept whatever
inert squiggle is left.D
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